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1 Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce a general model of a random electorate of
N voters described by their preferences over two alternatives. Our model will admit, as
special cases, the two most popular models in the literature on power measurement. The
rst one, called Impartial Culture (IC) is the basis of the celebrated Penrose-Banzhaf power
index (Penrose (1946), Banzhaf (1965)). It assumes that the preferences of the voters over the
two alternatives are independent and equally likely: correlation among the preferences of the
voters is totally precluded. The second one, called Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) which
has been pioneered independently in voting theory by Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981),
Good and Mayer (1975), Fishburn and Gehrlein (1976) and Kuga and Nagatani (1974) is
the basis (as forcefully demonstrated by Stra¢ n (1977, 1988)) of another celebrated power
index due to Shapley and Shubik (Shapley and Shubik (1954), Stra¢ n (1977, 1988)). The
IAC model introduces correlation among voters and the specic distributional assumption
which is considered implies that the real random variable dened as the number of voters
supporting the rst alternative is uniform over all feasible integers. From a computational
perspective, this distributional property of the IAC model makes it very handy as compared
to some other models and probably explains its success. Further, as noted convincingly by
Chamberlain and Rothschild, the IAC model is more attractive than the IC model in the
sense that the electoral predictions of the IAC models dont display a discontinuity in the
neighborhood of the outcome of a tied election.
Given a random electorate , the power of a voter is dened as the probability of being
pivotal1 i.e. as the probability of being able to change the electoral outcome by his or
her vote. Given that we will focus on a symmetric simple game (the ordinary majority
game), if the model of random electorate  is fully symmetric (i.e. if the preferences are
interchangeable), then all voters will have the same power denoted Piv(;N). Both the IC
and the IAC models are symmetric. For the IC model, this denes the Penrose-Banzhaf
power index Piv(IC;N) while for the IAC model this denes the Shapley-Shubik power
index Piv(IAC;N). It is well known that Piv(IC;N) is of order 1p
N
and Piv(IAC;N) is
equal to 1
N
.
The main purpose of this paper is to continue the exploration of the implications of
correlation on the asymptotic behavior of the power index. Precisely, we will consider
a general family of models of random electorate  and study the asymptotic behavior of
Piv(;N) with respect to N . Our motivation to do so is to depart from the IAC model
1Good and Mayer (1975) refers to this as the e¢ cacy of a vote.
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which assumes that the correlation is the same for all pairs of voters in the population. It
is likely that the intensity of the correlation between the votes of i and j will depend upon
some characteristics of i and j suggesting that the correlation may vary from one pair to
another. Most of the paper will however be based on a particular pattern of heterogeneity.
Precisely, we will assume that the voters are partitioned into groups and that: correlation
is positive and identical for any pair of voters belonging to the same group and null for any
pair of voters belonging to two di¤erent groups. We will assume that within each group the
correlation is dened as in the IAC model. This gives the IC and the IAC models as special
cases: the IC model emerges when all the groups are singletons and the IAC model arises
when there is a unique group which is then the entire population.
While particular, this model is general enough to cover many situations. We will o¤er a
separate treatment of two polar cases. The rst case is the case where there is a bound on
the size of the groups; this bound does not depend upon the size of the population. This
assumption is well suited to capture local interactions (within the family or the workplace for
instance). The second case is the case where there is a xed number of groups; this means that
the size of the groups grows with the size of the population. This assumption is well suited
to describe large scale interactions (special interest groups, geographical territories, electoral
districts, countries if the population under scrutiny is multinational,...). After o¤ering some
general results, we proceed to the study of these two cases. The analysis of the two cases
uses di¤erent techniques. When  describes the local case, the use of some local versions of
the Central Limit Theorem allows to estimate Piv(;N). We show that it is of order 1p
N
and we calculate explicitly Lim
N!1
p
NPiv(;N). In contrast, when  describes the global
case, our estimation of Piv(;N) is based on di¤erent mathematical techniques. We address
the problem quite di¤erently using a combinatorial approach based on Ehrhart theory and
algorithmic tools for computing the number of integer points in parametric polytopes. We
show that Piv(;N) is of order 1
N
and we calculate explicitly Lim
N!1
NPiv(;N) in some
specic cases.
Related Literature
The partition random model explored in this paper has been suggested by Stra¢ n (1977)
under the name partial homogeneity. He suggests this model as an alternative to the existing
IC and IAC models but does not derive any general result. Instead, he proceeds to some
numerical calculations of the probability of being pivotal in the Canadian constitutional
amendment process. Stra¢ n writes: In the Canadian constitution example, it might be that
neither the independence assumption nor the homogeneity assumption describe the situation
very well. British Columbia and Québec, for example, might reasonably be expected to
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behave independently, while the four Atlantic provinces may have common interests and
might reasonably be considered to judge proposed constitutional amendment by a common set
of values. The most reasonable thing to do might be to partition the provinces into subsets
whose members are homogenous among themselves, but behave independently of the members
of other subsets".
Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981) also consider the case of a partition into two groups
and study the asymptotics of the probability of being pivotal under some general conditions:
the random draws of the parameter p (denoting the probability that any individual votes
for the rst alternative) in each of the two groups do not necessarily result from a uniform
distribution (a feature shared with Good and Mayer (1975)) and the draws are not necessarily
independent among the two groups.
Our model of correlation among voters aims to contribute to the existing studies of the
implications of correlation on power measurement. Knowing the exact magnitude of the
probability of being pivotal is interesting for itself but this information is also essential for
the design of the optimal weights of representatives, as argued convincingly by Barbera
and Jackson (2006). They introduce a block model which is quite similar to the model of
partitions which is considered here except for the fact that instead of IAC, they assume
perfect correlation within each block/group. Precisely, they describe it as follows: Each
country is made up of some number of blocks of agents, where agents within each block have
perfectly correlated preferences and preferences across blocks are independent. The blocks
within a country are of equal size. These assumptions reect the fact that countries are
often made up of some variety of constituencies, within which agents tend to have correlated
preferences. For instance, the farmers in a country might have similar opinions on a wide
variety of issues, as will union members, intellectuals, and so forth. The block model is a
stylized but useful way to introduce correlation among voterspreferences". They proceed to
a separate analysis of the xed-size-block model" and the xed-number-of-blocks model"
which parallels exactly our distinction between small and large groups. The block model"
was in fact introduced by Penrose (1952) in chapter 7 of his pioneering monograph. His
work is motivated by empirical considerations. He observes that if voters were voting
independently of each other, then the mean value of the statistics D
2
N
over an indenite period
of years (where D denotes the di¤erence between the votes of the two sides) would equal
unity. This prediction is violated in the case of the twenty-six American Presidential elections
that he examined. The mean value is much larger than 1. He concludes from that that this
marked excess over the theoretical value of unity may be interpreted as indicating that the
voters did not vote as random units but were grouped into blocs which voted independently.
4
The approximate size of each of a set of blocs taking the place of individuals is given by the
actual mean value of D
2
N
measured over a period of years".
2 The Model of a Random Electorate
A random electorate is a triple (N ; X; ) where N is a nite set of voters, X is a nite set
of alternatives and  is a probability distribution on PN (the set of functions from N to P)
where P is the set of linear orders over X. In the case where X consists of two alternatives
say 0 and 1, the set P contains two preferences (0 is preferred to 1, 1 is preferred to 0) which
will be coded 0 and 1 and PN will be identied with the Cartesian product f0; 1gN where N
denotes the cardinality of N . The rst popular random electorate model, called Impartial
Culture (IC), is dened by  (P ) = 1
2N
for all proles of preferences P = (P1; P2; :::; PN) in
f0; 1gN . The IC model assumes that the preferences of the voters are independent Bernoulli
random variables with a parameter p equal to 1
2
(i.e. the electorate is not biased towards
a particular candidate). In contrast, the second popular random electorate model, called
Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) is dened as follows. The parameter p is drawn in
[0; 1] from the uniform distribution and, conditional on the draw of p, the preferences of the
voters are independent Bernoulli preferences with parameter p. The probability of prole
(P1; P2; :::; PN) is therefore  (P ) =
R 1
0
pk (1  p)N k dp where k is the number of coordinates
equal to 0 in P . Using the formula:Z 1
0
pt(1  p)N tdp = (t)!(N   t)!
(N + 1)!
(1)
we obtain that  (P ) = 1
(N+1)(Nk)
. The terminology IAC results from the fact that in the
IAC model, the events Ek 
n
P 2 f0; 1gN : # fi 2 N : Pi = 0g = k
o
for k = 0; 1; :::; N are
equally likely. Since there are
 
N
k

such events, the probability that k voters vote 0 is equal
to 1
N+1
for all k = 0; 1; :::; N .
A social choice mechanism is a monotonic mapping 	 from f0; 1gN into [0; 1] where 	(P )
denotes the probability of choosing candidate 0 when the prole of preferences is P 2 3. In
this paper, we will focus on the standard majority mechanism Maj dened as follows (with
#N0 (P ) denoting the number of 0 in P ):
2In this binary setting, if 	(P ) 2 f0; 1g, a social choice mechanism is dened alternatively by a simple
game (Taylor and Zwicker (1999)).
3We will not make any distinction between preferences and behavior. There is no room for strategic
behavior here: if we interpret 	 as a direct revelation game, then voting sincerely according to his/her
preference is the unique (weakly) dominant strategy.
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Maj(P ) =
8<:
0 if #N0 (P ) < N
2
1 if #N0 (P ) > N
2
1
2
if #N0 (P ) = N
2
If N is odd, the third eventuality never arises and the mechanism is deterministic: the
probability of choosing 0 is either 0 or 1 . If N is even, the third alternative arises when the
electorate is split into two groups of equal size and the tie is broken by using a fair lottery.
The whole paper is about evaluating the probability of being pivotal. Recall that voter i 2 N
is pivotal if her or his vote is susceptible to change the result of the election. We denote by
Ek(i) the event dened by Ek(i) = fP 2 f0; 1gN : #N0(P i) = kg for k = 0; 1; : : : ; N   1,
and by Piv(; i; N) the probability that i is pivotal (P i denotes the reduced prole obtained
by removing the vote of i). It is easy to see that Piv(; i; N) = (EN 1
2
(i)) when N is odd,
and Piv(; i; N) = 1
2
(EN 2
2
(i)) + 1
2
(EN
2
(i)) when N is even. The slight di¤erence between
the even and odd cases lies in the fact that in the odd case, the vote of i is always able
to change the result, whereas in the even case, her or his vote creates an equality and the
electoral outcome will change with probability 1
2
, depending on the lottery result.
As we consider the standard majority mechanism, if the probability measure is symmetric,
then Piv(; i; N) does not depend on i and will be denoted shortly by Piv (;N). The
probability Piv (;N) has been calculated for the two popular models of random electorate
which have just been dened. For the IC model, Piv (IC;N) =
 
N 1
N 1
2

1
2N 1 when N is odd
and Piv (;N) =
 
N 1
N 2
2

1
2N 1 when N is even. For the IAC model, Piv (IAC;N) =
1
N
for
both cases. Using Stirlings formula, N ! ' p2N  N
e
N
, we deduce that when N gets large
Piv (IC;N) behaves like
q
2
N
' 0:797 88p
N
.
In this paper, we assume that the electorateN is partitioned intoK groupsN1;N2; :::;NK
i.e. [1kKNk = N and Nk \ Nk0 = ? for all k; k0 such that k 6= k0. We will denote by
Nk the size of group k:
PK
k=1Nk = N and without loss of generality we assume that
N1  N2  :::  NK .We consider the following random electorate model.
We assume that the preferences of any voter i from group Nk is the realization of a
Bernoulli random variable with parameter pk and that conditional on pk, the preferences
of any two voters in that group are independent. We assume that the coordinates of the
vector (p1; p2; :::; pK) are the realizations of K independent random variables with a uniform
distribution on [0; 1]. As Piv(; i; N) is the same for all voters i belonging to the same group,
this probability will be denoted by Pivk(;N) for all members of group Nk.
We start our calculations by reducing the problem of computing Pivk(;N) to a well
dened combinatorial problem which amounts to count the number of possible decompositions
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of a given integer into K integers under some specic constraints.4 We will denote by
( M;R1; :::; Rk; :::; RK) the set of decompositions (x1; : : : ; xK) of the integer M into K
ordered integers (M = x1 + : : : + xK) under the constraint that the kth integer xk does not
exceed Rk, and by  ( M;R1; :::; Rk; :::; RK) the cardinality of this set. To illustrate the use
of such decompositions in our calculations, consider a society where the number N of voters
is odd and multiple of 3: N = 3K with K odd. The society is therefore divided into K
groups of size 3 each (three members). Take K = 21 and suppose that i is a member of
group 1. Voter i will be pivotal if in the rest of the society 31 voters vote 0 and 31 voters vote
1. How to enumerate the number of possible decompositions of 31 into 21 integers such that
the rst one cannot exceed 2 and the other twenty ones cannot exceed 3? One possibility is
(2,2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,0,...,0) and all subsequent permutations but we can also vary the choice
of integers by taking for instance (1,2,2,2,2,...2,2,0,0,0,0,0) where 2" appears 15 times.5
Lemma 1: For all k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg,
1. IfN is odd, Pivk(;N) = (N 12 ; N1; :::; Nk 1; Nk 1; Nk+1; :::; NK) 1Nk (
Q
l 6=k
1
Nl+1
) (1:a)
2. IfN is even, Pivk(;N) = (N 22 ; N1; :::; Nk 1; Nk 1; Nk+1; :::; NK) 1Nk (
Q
l 6=k
1
Nl+1
) (1:b)
Proof. Consider the case where N is odd. We obtain:
Pivk(;N) =
X
(N 12 ;N1;:::;Nk 1;Nk 1;Nk+1;:::;NK)

Nk   1
xk
Z 1
0
pxkl (1  pk))Nk xk 1 dpk


"Y
l 6=k

Nl
xl
Z 1
0
pxll (1  pl))Nl xl dpl
#
By using formula (1), we deduce:
Pivk(;N) =
X
(N 12 ;N1;:::;Nk 1;Nk 1;Nk+1;:::;NK)
1
Nk
 Y
l 6=k
1
Nl + 1
!
=


N   1
2
; N1; :::; Nk 1; Nk   1; Nk+1; :::; NK

1
Nk
 Y
l 6=k
1
Nl + 1
!
4Note that there are at most K cells i.e. K non zero integers in the decomposition and there is an upper
bound on the entries of each cell. Our problem is close but not totally equivalent to the problem of counting
compositions of integers with restrictions on the summands and their number as presented in Flajolet and
Sedgewick (2009).
5In that case, our rst result (Proposition 1) will imply that the total number of decompositions behaves
as c4
N
3
p
N where c is a universal constant.
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The proof in the case where N is even proceeds along the same lines. 
Let us check quickly that the IC and IAC models correspond to two extreme special cases
of this general framework. The IC value is attached to the case where K = N i.e. where the
partition structure consists of N singletons:
Pivk(IC;N) = Piv(IC;N) = 

N   1
2
; 1; :::; 1; Nk   1; 1; :::; 1

1
2N
=

N   1
N 1
2

1
2N 1
since 
 
N 1
2
; 1; :::; 1; 0; 1; :::; 1

=
 
N 1
N 1
2

. The IAC value is attached to the case where
K = 1 i.e. where the partition structure consists of a single set: the set N :
Pivk(IAC;N) = Piv(IAC;N) = 

N   1
2
; N   1

1
N
=
1
N
since 
 
N 1
2
; N   1 = 1:
An alternative approach to the counting problem is based on probability. Let Xik denote
the Bernoulli random variable describing the preference of voter i in group k and let Sk andbS denote respectively the sums Pj2Nk Xjk and PKk=1Pj2Nk Xjk = PKk=1 Sk. With these
notations, we can express the pivot probabilities as follows:
Pivk(;N) = 
bS i = N   1
2

when N is odd and
Pivk(;N) =
1
2


bS i = N   2
2

+ 
bS i = N
2

when N is even
This probabilistic approach will be very useful when we will focus on the asymptotic
behavior of Pivk(;N) when N tends to innity. Note that all the random variables Xik are
symmetric in the sense that Pr(Xik = 0) = Pr(Xik = 1) = 12 since Pr(Xik = 0) =
R 1
0
pdp = 1
2
.
We have E [Xik] = 12  0 + 12  1 = 12 and V ar [Xik] = E [X2ik]   E [Xik]2 = 14 . But two
random variables Xik and Xjl are independent i¤ k 6= l. If not, we have:
Pr(Xik = 0; Xjk = 0) =
Z 1
0
p2dp =
1
3
>
1
4
The two variables are positively correlated: Cov(Xik; Xjk) = 13   14 = 112 ; the coe¢ cient
of correlation  is then equal to 1
3
.
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3 The case of Many Small Groups
In this section, we will focus on the case where there is an exogenous upper bound S on the
size of the groups in the partition (N1;N2; :::;NK). This implies that as N gets large, then
the number of groups increases.
To motivate the general result which will be presented hereafter, it is instructive to
consider the case where S = 2. In any such partition structure, the groups are either
singletons or pairs. We can think of this partition as describing a society where there are
singles and couples but no other family types. Consider the case where N is even and all
the groups are exactly of size 2. From (1:b), we deduce that:
Pivk(;N) = Piv(;N) = 

N   2
2
; 1; 2; :::; 2; 2

1
2

1
3
N 2
2
:
We can check that:6


N   2
2
; 1; 2; :::; 2; 2

=
bN 24 cX
k=0
 
N 2
2

!
(k!)2
 
N 2
2
  2k!
 
N
2
  k
k + 1
!
:
Indeed, counting how many decompositions of N 2
2
into N
2
integers chosen in f0; 1; 2g
amounts rst to choose how many pairs k we choose among N 2
2
. The number of possibilities
is (
N 2
2
)!
(k!)((N 2
2
 k)!) . This value of k cannot exceed

N 2
4

.
To reach the integer N 2
2
, we need N 2
2
 2k singletons which can be chosen among N
2
 k.
The number of possibilities is (
N
2
 k)!
(N 2
2
 2k)!(k+1)! =
(N
2
 1 k)
(N 2
2
 2k)!(k)!
N
2
 k
k+1
.
After collecting the terms, we obtain the expression reported above.
Calculating the above sum is not an immediate combinatorial exercise7 and we will mostly
focus on the asymptotic behavior of Piv(;N).
We conjecture that:
Lim
N!1
(N) 
p
N
0B@b
N 2
4 cX
k=0
 
N 2
2

!
(k!)2
  
N 2
2
  2k!  N   2k2k + 2
1CA 1
2


1
3
N 2
2
exists.
The following Table contains some numerical values of(N) which supports this conjecture:
6bxc denotes the integer part of x.
7We were not able to derive a closed form value of this sum through the use of combinatorial identities.
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N 102 202 1002 5002 100002
(N) 0.69015 0.69056 0.6909 0.69097 0.69098
Table 1: Values of (N)
Interestingly, the function  seems to behave asymptotically as the function  dened
as follows:
(N) 
p
N
0B@b
N 2
4 cX
k=0
 
N 2
2

!
(k!)2
  
N 2
2
  2k!
1CA 1
3
N 2
2
The following Table contains some numerical values of (N) which supports this guess:
N 102 202 1002 10002 100002
(N) 0.69525 0.69314 0.69143 0.69103 0.69099
Table 1 bis: Values of (N)
We now prove a generalized version of the conjecture. To proceed, we use a probabilistic
approach. We assume that all the groups have a size smaller than S and we will be interested
in societies where the set of voters is partitioned into groups of size s where s runs from 1
to S. We will consider societies where N gets indenitely large but such that the proportion
of the population in each type of group (described by its size) remains invariant in the
population growth process. We will denote by s the proportion of voters in a group of size
s. We assume that s = sK
s
N
where Ks is an integer for all s = 1; :::; S and N =
PS
s=1 sK
s.
The initial society contains Ks groups of size s. For any integer R, its Rth replica has N
voters where N is dened as follows:
N = N(R) = R
SX
s=1
Kss
In this context, Pivk(;N) is the same for all groups Nk of size s and will be denoted
by Piv(s)(R; N), the probability for a voter belonging to a group of size s to be pivotal.
The following proposition gives the asymptotic behavior of Piv(s)(R; N) when N gets large
(equivalently where R gets large).
Proposition 1: Let R be the random electorate dened above. For all s = 1; 2; :::; S,
Lim
R!1
p
NPiv(s)(R; N) =
1q
1
6
+ 
1
12
+ 1
12
PS
l=2 
ll
p
2
:
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Proof. For all R and all i = 1; 2; :::; N(R), we arrange the random variables XRi describing
the individual votes in the Rth replica in a triangular array8 dened as follows: the rst RK1
variables describe the vote of voters in groups of size 1, the next 2RK2 variables describe
the votes of voters in groups of size 2 and so on.
We obtain
2 (R)  V ar(
NX
i=1
XRi ) =
NX
i=1
V ar(XRi ) +
SX
s=1
RKss(s  1)Cov(XRi ; XRj )
where Cov(XRi ; X
R
j ) denotes the covariance between X
R
i and X
R
j when i and j belong
to the same group. We have shown before that:
V ar(XRi ) =
1
4
for all i = 1; 2; :::; N
Cov(XRi ; X
R
j ) =
1
12
for all i; j = 1; :::; N if i and j belong to the same group
We obtain:
 (R) =
p
N
0@
vuut1
6
+
1
12
+
1
12
SX
s=2
ss
1A
A random variable XRi is of type s if R
Ps 1
l=1 lK
l < i  RPsl=1 lK l. We pack the sRKs
random variables of type s into RKs random variables
 
ZRks

1kRKs where Z
R
ks is dened as
follows:
ZRks = r i¤
ksX
i=(k 1)s+1
XRis = r
This denes a new triangular array
 
ZRks

1sS;1kRKs (indexed by R) where the random
variables ZRks are independent. Hereafter, we will refer to Z
R
ks as a random variable of type
s. We note that all random variables are integer valued: the support of a random variable
of type s is f0; 1; :::; sg. Let 1  i  N(R) be a member of a group of type s and for each
value of the row index R, consider the random variable SRi dened as follows:
SRi =
N(R)X
j=1;j 6=i
XRj =
SX
l=1;l 6=s
KlX
k=1
ZRkl +
Ks 1X
k=1
ZRks +W
R
i
8A triangular array is a collection of

yk1 ; y
k
2 ; :::; y
k
n(k)

k1
of random variables on a probability space.
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where WRi 
Ps
j=2 1XRjs . The probability that i of type s is pivotal, Piv(s)(R; N) is
equal to the probability of the event

SRi =
N 1
2
	
if N is odd and to half the probability of
the event

SRi =
N 2
2
	 [ SRi = N2 	 if N is even.
We note that the span of the random variables ZRkl for 1  l  S and 1  k  K l and
WRi is equal to 1. Further, the distribution functions of these random variables belong to
a nite set of cardinality at most S, are not degenerate and occur innitely often (except
possibly WRi ) in the sequence
 
ZRkl

1lS;1kKl [

WRi
	
R1
. Let  > 0:
If N is odd, since E

SRi

= N 1
2
, we deduce from the local central limit theorem on
lattice distributions listed as theorem 2 in Petrov (1975)9 that if R is large enough:  SRi Piv(s)(R; N)  1p2
  
Similarly, if N is even, since E

SRi

= N 1
2
, we deduce from Petrovs theorem that if R
is large enough: 
 
SRi

Pr

SRi =
N   2
2

  e
  1
82(SRi )
p
2
  
 
SRi

Pr

SRi =
N
2

  e
  1
82(SRi )
p
2
  
Since e
  1
82(SRi )p
2
tends to 1p
2
and
(SRi )
(R)
tends to 1 when R tends to +1, we deduce that
if R is large enough:  (R)Piv(s)(R; N)  1p2
  :

The random variable SRi = S
R XRi introduced in the proof of Proposition 1 counts the
number of votes in favor of 1 in the population without individual i. Proposition 1 provides
information on the asymptotic behavior of the probability of the event

SRi =
N 1
2
	
. To
illustrate Proposition 1, consider the case of an electorate, denoted sR, where all the groups
have the same size s. In such case, we deduce from our result that:
9Chapter 7, Section 1, p 189. Petrovs theorem in what follows.
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Piv(s)(R; N) = Piv(
s
R; N) '
1p
N
 2
s
3
2 (2 + s)
The following Table lists a sample of values of the probability of being pivotal for a
sample of values of s.
s 1 2 3 4 5 ... 10p
NPiv(sR; N) 0.798 0.691 0.618 0.564 0.522 ... 0.399
Table 2:
p
N  Probability of being pivotal as a function of s
We can also handle mixed situations i.e. random electorates  where the sizes of the
groups di¤er across voters. For instance, when the random electorate  is such that 1 = 0:2,
2 = 0:3; 3 = 0:4 and 4 = 0:1, we obtain : Piv(R) ' 0:658 85. We could interpret these
groups as family groups: singles, couples without children voting, couples with one children
voting, and so on.
Remark 1. The proof strategy of Proposition 1 based on a specic version of the local
central limit theorem has exploited the fact that the individuals could be partitioned in a
regular way and that in each group the probability draw of the votes in the group was not
changing with the size of the population. From our construction, in each group of size s, the
random number of votes for 1 is described by a multinomial probability law independent of
N with values in the set f0; 1; :::; sg. So partitioning per se is not enough to permit a direct
use of that version of the local central limit theorem; we need invariance of the law with
respect to N .10
Remark 211. We could alternatively look at the probability of being pivotal of a group
of size
j

p
N
k
where  > 0 is xed instead of a group of size 1 as done until now. Such a
group, acting as a block, is pivotal i¤ :
N
2
  
p
N
2
 SRN 
N
2
+

p
N
2
where:
SRN =
N(R)X
i=1
XRi
10We dont mean that it is a necessary condition per se. It is a necessary condition to appeal at the
theorem that we have used. We conjecture that additional results could be deduced from other local central
limit theorems (like for instance Mc Donald (1979)).
11We thank S. Brams for having raised the question answered in that remark.
13
and
 
XRi

1iN(R) is an arbitrary triangular array of Bernoulli random variables of
parameter 1
2
. Let us assume that this triangular array is m(R)-dependent12 and such that
for some  > 0 and some constant K:
V ar
 
XRi+1 + :::+X
R
j
  (j   i)K for all i; jand R;
Lim
R!1
V ar

XR1 + :::+X
R
N(R)

N(R)
exists and is nonzero,
Lim
R!1
m(R)2+
N(R)
= 0:
Since the Bernoulli variables have moments of any order, we deduce from Berks theorem
that
XR1 +:::+X
R
N(R)
 N(R)
2p
N(R)
is asymptotically normal with mean 0 and variance v where v 
Lim
R!1
V ar(XR1 +:::+XRn )
N(R)
(see Appendix 1). We deduce that the probability of a group of relative
size 
p
N to be pivotal, denoted Piv(;N); is approximately13 equal to:
Prob
(
N
2
  
p
N
2
 SRN 
N
2
+

p
N
2
)
' Prob
n
  
2
 N(0;
p
v)  
2
o
' 
r
1
2v
This weak version of the pivotality result holds in a much larger class of electorates. The
notion of m dependency matches di¤erent possibilities. First, we could continue to consider
partitions into groups whose size can even increase slowly with N . What is essential, as
reected by the other two conditions of Berks theorem, is to bound in an appropriate way the
variance of any pack of random variables and to have the variance of the electorate to behave
asymptotically as the size of the electorate. For the sake of illustration of such construction,
consider the case where the N(R) voters are partitioned into consecutive blocks where each
block has a size m = m(R) = bN 14 c. We assume that m(R) is even and that within each
block the Bernoulli random variables describing the votes are correlated as follows. Let
Z = (Z1; Z2; :::; Zm 1; Zm) be a m dimensional random vector such that (i) the coordinates
are independent random variables, (ii) the rst m   1 coordinates Zj j = 1; :::;m   1 are
12For a denition of the notion of m-dependency, see Appendix 1, footnote 20.
13Note that here, in contrast to the case where we consider a single voter or even a nite set of voters
whose size does not depend upon N , the limit probability of the group of being pivotal does not change if
we change the quota
j

p
N
k
into the quota
j

p
N
k
+ C where C is a constant.
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Bernouilli random variables with parameter 1
2
and (iii) the random variable Zm takes the
values 0 and 1 with the probability p
2
and the value 1
2
with the probability 1   p where
p 2 [0; 1]. Given Z, the vector X is constructed as follows:
XRi = Z
i for all i = 1; :::;m  1
XRm =

1 if either Zm = 1 or Zm = 1
2
and Maj(Z1; Z2; :::; Zm 1) = 1
0 if either Zm = 0 or Zm = 1
2
and Maj(Z1; Z2; :::; Zm 1) = 0
In words, the mth player of each block votes independently of the other voters with
some probability or follows the majority opinion of the other voters with the complement
probability. It is immediate to check that XRm is a Bernouilli random variable with parameter
1
2
. Let us evaluate how his vote is correlated with the vote of any other voter i. From above
we deduce that:
Cov(XRm; X
R
i ) = Prob(X
R
m = 1 and X
R
i = 1) 
1
4
= Prob(Zm = 1 and XRi = 1) +
Prob(Zm =
1
2
; Maj(Z1; Z2; :::; Zm 1) = 1 and XRi = 1) 
1
4
=
p
4
+
1  p
2
Prob( Maj(Z1; Z2; :::; Zm 1) = 1 j XRi = 1) 
1
4
So we are left with the evaluation of the conditional probability Prob(Maj(Z1; Z2; :::; Zm 1) =
1 j ZRi = 1) which is equal to
Pm 2
k=m 2
2
 
m 2
k

1
2m 2 =
1
2
+ 1
2m 1
 
m 2
m 2
2

. If m is large, we deduce
from Stirlings formula that:
1
2m 1

m  2
m 2
2

' 1
2
r
2
m
Collecting the terms together, we derive Prob( Maj(Z1; Z2; :::; Zm 1) = 1 j ZRi = 1) '
1
2

1 +
q
2
m

and therefore:
Cov(XRm; X
R
i ) '
p
4
+
1  p
4
 
1 +
r
2
m
!
  1
4
' 1  pp
m
for all i = 1; :::;m  1
The covariance matrix of each block is almost diagonal. We obtain that in each block
V ar
 
XR1 + :::+X
R
m
 ' m
4
+ 2(1 p)
p
mp

. Conditions (ii) and (iii) of Berks theorem follow
easily. Here v = 1
4
. Property (iv) also holds true since for any  < 2; m(R)
2+
N(R)
= N 
1
2
+ 
4 tends
to 0 when N tends to innity. In that example, correlation (which concerns only a unique
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voter) collapses as the number of voter grows. We can provide examples where it is not the
case
Second, we could even abandon completely the idea of partitioning of voters into blocs and
move instead towards local interaction. Indeed, m dependence (even with m independent
of N) does not force partition. For instance, let Y1; Y2; :::::: be a sequence of independent
Bernoulli variables with parameter 1
2
and let Xi be dened as follows:
X1 = Y1 and Xi =

Yi with probability p
Yi 1 with probability 1  p
where p 2 [0; 1]. It is easy to check that the Xi are Bernouilli random variables with
parameter 1
2
. Note also that for all i  314, Cov(Xi; Xi 1) = p(1 p)4 and Cov(Xi; Xi+m) = 0
whenever m > 1. Indeed, XiXi 1 = 1 is the union of the following four disjoint events:
either:
fXi = Yi = 1 and Xi 1 = Yi 1 = 1g ; or fXi = Yi = 1 and Xi 1 = Yi 2 = 1g or
fXi = Yi 1 = 1 and Xi 1 = Yi 2 = 1g or fXi = Yi 1 = 1 and Xi 1 = Yi 1g
Using independence, we deduce that the probabilities of the rst three events are respectively
p2
4
; p(1 p)
4
and (1 p)
2
4
while the probability of the fourth one is equal to p(1 p)
2
. Therefore the
probability of the event fXiXi 1 = 1g is equal to p2+2p(1 p)+(1 p)
2
4
+ p(1 p)
4
= 1
4
+ p(1 p)
4
.
In this construction, the sequence Y is a sequence of independent signals : voter is
preference follows his own signal with some probability p and follows the previous signal
with probability 1   p. This makes every voter correlated with his two adjacent neighbors.
There is no way in which we can partition the voters into blocks of size 2.
4 The Case of Few Large Groups
In this section, we consider the polar case of a society divided into a nite (possibly large)
number of groups. This means that as N gets larger and larger, the number of voters
in each group gets larger and larger. This peculiarity prevents us from applying the same
probabilistic approach as in the preceding section To circumvent this di¢ culty, we will tackle
the problem from a di¤erent combinatorial angle. For xed values of K, the general problem
of computing the number  (M;R1; :::; Rk; :::; RK) can be phrased as counting the exact
14When i = 2, Cov(X1; X2) =
1 p
4 .
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number of integer solutions of a system of linear inequalities with integer coe¢ cients, where
the variables are xk (k = 1; :::; K) and the parameters are M and Rk (k = 1; :::; K), which is
equivalent to count the number of integer points inside a parametric convex polytop. There
is a well established mathematical approach for performing such a calculation, based on
Ehrharts theory (Ehrhart, 1962, 1967, 1977) and e¢ cient counting algorithms15. We refer
to Lepelley et al. (2008) and Wilson and Pritchard (2007) for more details on the use of
these tools in probability calculations under IAC hypothesis in voting theory. Most of the
results presented in the following subsections have been obtained by applying (parameterized)
Barvinoks algorithm (Barvinok, 1994; Barvinok and Pommersheim,1999)16.
4.1 A Preliminary Result
It can be noticed that, when the number N1 of voters in the largest group represents more
than 50% of the total number of voters, then the probability of casting a decisive vote only
depends, in each group, on the value of N1. More precisely, we have the following general
result (Recall that bxc denotes the integer part of x).
Proposition 2: If N1 

N
2

+ 1, then Piv1(;N) = 1N1 and Pivk(;N) =
1
N1+1
for
k = 2; 3; :::; K.
Proof. Let xk be the value of the kth term in the decomposition of

N 1
2

: x1+ :::+xk+ :::+
xK =

N 1
2

. If N1 

N
2

+1, then N2+N3+ :::+Nk+ :::+NK 

N 1
2

. Consequently, for
k = 2; 3; :::; K, xk can take any integer value between 0 andNk (including 0 andNk) and when
x2; x3; :::; xK are set, the value of x1 is given in a unique way by x1 =

N 1
2
 x2 x3 ::: xK .
The number of possible decompositions is then given by
(

N   1
2

; N1; N2; :::; Nk; :::; NK) = (N2 + 1)(N3 + 1):::(NK + 1)
and the result follows from relations (1.a) and (1.b). 
4.2 The Case of Two Groups
Let us consider the case where K = 2 i.e. the situation where the voters are partitioned into
two groups. This setting has been examined by various authors in the literature including
15For a general background on Ehrhart theory and on the general problem of counting integer points in
polytopes, see for example Beck and Robins (2007).
16For a rigorous description of this algorithm and for implementation details, see Verdoolage et al. (2004,
2005).
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Beck (1975), Kleiner (1980), Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981) and Le Breton and Lepelley
(2014).
In such a case, if N is odd, then N1 > N2 as the two integers dont have the same parity.
It is easily seen that:


N   1
2
; N1   1; N2

= N2 + 1 and 

N   1
2
; N1; N2   1

= N2
and therefore:
Piv1(;N) =
1
N1
and Piv2(;N) =
1
N1 + 1
in accordance with Proposition 2.
4.3 Three groups of voters
In this section, we consider the case where the population is divided into three groups of
voters i.e. K = 3: N1  N2  N3 and N1 +N2 +N3 = bN + 1, with bN even.
Proposition 3: 1. If N1  bN2 + 1 (in accordance with our preliminary result),
Piv1(;N) =
1
N1
and Piv2(;N) = Piv3(;N) = 1N1+1
2. If N1  bN2 ,
Piv1(;N) =
4N21+4N1(N2  bN 2)+4N22 4N2( bN+1)+ bN( bN+2)
4N1(N2+1)(N1+N2  bN 2) ,
Piv2(;N) =
4N21+4N1(N2  bN 1)+4N22 4N2( bN+2)+ bN( bN+2)
4(N1+1)N2(N1+N2  bN 2)
Piv3(;N) =
4N21+4N1(N2  bN)+4N22 4N2 bN+ bN2 2 bN 4)
4(N1+1)(N2+1)(N1+N2  bN 1)
Proof. The value of ( bN
2
; N1   1; N2; N3) is given by the number of integer solutions of the
following set of (in)equalities, where xk can be interpreted as the number of voters voting
for alternative 0 in group k, k = 1; 2; 3:
0  x1  N1   1
0  x2  N2
0  x3  N3
x1 + x2 + x3 =
bN
2
Given the last equality, N3 = N  N1  N2 and the above set of inequalities reduces to:
0  x1  N1   1
0  x2  N2
0  x3  N  N1  N2
x1 + x2 + x3 =
bN
2
where the parameters satisfy:
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N1  N2
2N2 +N1  N   1  0 and
N1 +N2  N + 1
A representation for the number of integer solutions of this set of inequalities with three
variables and three parameters (N1, N2 and N) can be derived by using the multiparameter
version of the Barvinoks algorithm (see Lepelley et al. (2008)). We obtain:
(
bN
2
; N1   1; N2; N3) = ( bN  N1  N2 + 2)(N2 + 1) = (N3 + 1)(N2 + 1)
if N1  bN2 + 1 and
(
bN
2
; N1   1; N2; N3) = (  bN2 + 2 bN(2N1 + 2N2   1)  4(N21 +N1(N2   2) +N2(N2   1))=4
if N1  bN2 .
Representations for ( bN
2
; N1; N2   1; N3) and ( bN2 ; N1; N2; N3   1) can be derived in a
similar way to obtain:
(
bN
2
; N1; N2   1; N3) = ( bN  N1  N2 + 2)N2 = (N3 + 1)N2
if N1  bN2 + 1 and
(
bN
2
; N1; N2   1; N3) = (  bN2 + 2 bN(2N1 + 2N2   1)  4(N21 +N1(N2   1) +N2(N2   1))=4
if N1  bN2 ;
(
bN
2
; N1; N2; N3   1) = ( bN  N1  N2 + 1)(N2 + 1) = N3(N2 + 1)
if N1  bN2 + 1 and
(
bN
2
; N1; N2; N3   1) = (  bN2 + 2 bN(2N1 + 2N2 + 1)  4(N21 +N1N2 +N22   1))=4
if N1  bN2 .
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Observe that we recover the results we have mentioned for two groups by taking N3 = 0.
From the above results, we can now derive the probability of casting a decisive vote for a
voter belonging to each of the three groups. We obtain :
Piv1(;N) =
(N3 + 1)(N2 + 1)
N1(N2 + 1)(N3 + 1)
=
1
N1
Piv2(;N) =
(N3 + 1)N2
(N1 + 1)N2(N3 + 1)
=
1
N1 + 1
Piv3(;N) =
N3(N2 + 1)
(N1 + 1)(N2 + 1)N3
=
1
N1 + 1
if N1  bN2 + 1 and
Piv1(;N) =
4N21 + 4N1(N2   bN   2) + 4N22   4N2( bN + 1) + bN( bN + 2)
4N1(N2 + 1)(N1 +N2   bN   2)
Piv2(;N) =
4N21 + 4N1(N2   bN   1) + 4N22   4N2( bN + 2) + bN( bN + 2)
4(N1 + 1)N2(N1 +N2   bN   2)
Piv3(;N) =
4N21 + 4N1(N2   bN) + 4N22   4N2 bN + bN2   2 bN   4)
4(N1 + 1)(N2 + 1)(N1 +N2   bN   1)
if N1  bN2 . 
In order to simplify the above representations, let 1 = N1= bN and 2 = N2= bN denote
the proportion of voters in the rst and the second group. Replacing N1 by 1 bN and N2 by
2 bN and assuming that bN is large give, we obtain the following approximation.
Corollary 1: Let c3(1; 2) =
421+412 41+422 42+1
412(1+2 1) if 1  0:50 and c3(1; 2) = 1=1 if
1 > 0:50. Then for k = 1; 2; 3, Pivk(;N) ' c3(1; 2) 1N .
We nally obtain that, for N large, the probability of casting a decisive vote for a voter
belonging to an electorate divided in three groups is approximately equal to the Shapley-
Shubik index multiplied by c3(1; 2). We give in Table 3 some computed values of c3(1; 2)
for various values of 1 and 2.
1 / 2 1/3 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
1/3 2.250 - - - -
0.35 2.248 2.245 - - -
0.40 2.219 2.214 2.188 - -
0.45 2.145 2.143 2.130 2.099 -
0.50 2 2 2 2 2
> 0.50 1=1 1=1 1=1 1=1 1=1
Table 3 : Values of c3(1; 2)
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These values show that the probability of casting a decisive vote is maximum when
1 = 2 = 1=3, i.e. when each of the three groups has the same size.
4.4 The Symmetric Case
We consider here the case with N1 = N2 = ::: = NK =
bN+1
K
and we assume that N = bN + 1
is a multiple of K, which implies that K is odd. In this symmetric case, the value of
(
bN
2
;
bN+1
K
  1; bN+1
K
; :::;
bN+1
K
) is given as the number of integer solutions of the following set
of (in)equalities:
0  x1  bN+1K   1
0  x2  bN+1K
:::
0  xK  bN+1K
x1 + x2 + :::+ xK =
bN
2
For specic small values of K, it is fairly easy to obtain close forms for the probability
of being pivotal as a function of the parameter N . Let us consider the rst values of K.
K = 3: To compute 
 bN
2
;
bN+1
3
  1; bN+1
3
;
bN+1
3

, we make use of the Barvinoks algorithm
to obtain:

 bK   1; bK; bK = ( bN + 2)( bN + 4)
12
for bN = 2 modulo 6. From this result, we derive:
Piv(;N) =
9( bN + 2)
4( bN + 1)( bN + 4) (2)
for bN = 2 modulo 6. Notice that this result is consistent with the representations given
in Proposition 3: replacing N1 and N2 by (N +1)=3 in the formulas given in this proposition
leads to (2).
Hence, we get for N large:
Piv(;N) ' c3 1
N
with c3 = 94 = 2:25, in accordance with the result obtained in the preceding subsection
for 1 = 2 = 1=3.
 K = 5: We obtain via Barvinoks algorithm:
(
bN
2
;
bN + 1
5
  1;
bN + 1
5
;
bN + 1
5
;
bN + 1
5
;
bN + 1
5
) =
( bN + 2)( bN + 6)(23 bN2 + 276 bN + 928)
24000
21
from which we deduce
Piv(;N) =
25( bN + 2)(23 bN2 + 276 bN + 928)
192( bN + 1)( bN + 6)3
for bN = 4 modulo 10. In this case, the limiting value of the probability of casting a
decisive vote is given as:
Piv(;N) ' c5 1
N
with c5 = 575192 = 2:995.
 K = 7, K = 9 and K = 11: Although we have been able to obtain the complete
polynomials associated with ( bN
2
;
bN+1
K
  1; bN+1
K
; :::;
bN+1
K
) for K = 7; 9; 11, we only give here
the values of cK :
c7 =
41209
11520
= 3:577
c9 =
2337507
573440
= 4:076
and
c11 =
4199504287
928972800
= 4:521:
For values of K higher than 11, the implementation of the Barvinoks algorithm demands
a very long computation time that prevents from obtaining some numerical results. The
following proposition describes the asymptotic behavior of ( bN
2
;
bN+1
K
  1; bN+1
K
; :::;
bN+1
K
) when
N gets large.
Proposition 4: Let K be an odd number (K  3).
Let '(K) = lim
N!+1
[ 1
NK 1(
bN
2
;
bN+1
K
  1; bN+1
K
; :::;
bN+1
K
)]. Then, for each xed value of K, we
have:
'(K) =
1
(K   1)!
K 1
2X
m=0
( 1)m

K
m
 K   2m
2K
K 1
:
Proof. By denition, ( bN
2
;
bN+1
K
  1; bN+1
K
; :::;
bN+1
K
) is the number of integer solutions of the
following parametric linear system:8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0  x1  N
K
  1
0  xk  N
K
for all k = 2; :::; K
KX
k=1
xk =
N   1
2
22
We know by Ehrharts theorem (Ehrhart, 1967) that this number is a quasi-polynomial of
degree K 1 on the variable N . Hence, '(K) is equal to the leading coe¢ cient of this quasi-
polynomial17. As the additive constants in the second member of the constraints do not
a¤ect this coe¢ cient, '(K) is also the leading coe¢ cient of the quasi-polynomial computing
the number of integer solutions of the system8>>><>>>:
0  xk  N
K
for all k = 1; 2; :::; K
KX
k=1
xk =
N
2
The system represents the dilatation by the factor N of the rational (K   1) dimensional
polytope Q dened by: 8>>><>>>:
0  xk  1
K
for all k = 1; :::; K
KX
k=1
xk =
1
2
By Ehrharts theorem, and by denition of '(K), we know that '(K) is equal to the relative
volume of Q, which is the (normalized) volume in RK 1 of the full-dimensional polytope P
dened by: 8>>><>>>:
0  xk  1
K
for all k = 1; :::; K   1
K   2
2K

K 1X
k=1
xk  1
2
Let Vol(P) be the volume of P. To compute this volume, we consider some particular subsets
of RK 1. Let  and 0 be the K   1-dimensional simplices dened by:
 = fx 2 RK 1 : xk  0 for all k = 1; : : : ; K   1 and x1 + : : :+ xK 1  1=2g
0 = fx 2 RK 1 : xk  0 for all k = 1; : : : ; K   1 and x1 + : : :+ xK 1  (K   2)=2Kg
It is easy to see that Vol(P) = Vol(A) Vol(B), where:
A = fx 2  : xk  1=K; 8k = 1; : : : ; K   1g
B = fx 2 0 : xk  1=K;8k = 1; : : : ; K   1g
17A degree-d quasi-polynomial on the variable n is a polynomial expression f(n) =
Pd
i=0 ci(n)n
i, where
the coe¢ cients ci(n) are rational periodic numbers on n. A rational periodic number, of period q, on the
integer variable n is a function U : Z! Q such that U(n) = U(n0) whenever n  n0mod q.
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We only show how to compute Vol(A), the same method will be applied to obtain Vol(B).
For each i in f1; : : : ; K   1g let i = fx 2  : xi  1=Kg. More generally, for each non
empty subset S of f1; : : : ; K   1g, we dene S by S = \i2Si. Note that S = ; for
j S j> K 1
2
.
For S such that #S  K 1
2
, let #S = m and let tu be the translation of vector u, where
u is the vector of RK 1 dened by ui =   1K if i 2 S and ui = 0 if not. It is obvious that
tu(S) = (m), where (m) = fx 2 RK 1 : xk  0 for all k = 1; : : : ; K   1 and x1 +
: : :+xK 1  (K 2m)=2Kg. Since translations conserve volumes, and applying the formula
giving the volume of a simplex, we obtain:
Vol(S) = Vol((m)) =
1
(K   1)!
 K   2m
2K
K 1
On the other hand, we can write Vol(A) = Vol() Vol([K 1i=1 i). Applying the inclusion-
exclusion principle, we get:
Vol([K 1i=1 i) =
K 1
2X
m=1
( 1)m 1
X
S;jSj=m
Vol(S)
=
K 1
2X
m=1
( 1)m

K   1
m

1
(K   1)!
 K   2m
2K
K 1
Since Vol() = 1
(K 1)!
 
1
2
K 1
, we obtain:
Vol(A) =
1
(K   1)!
K 1
2X
m=0
( 1)m

K   1
m
 K   2m
2K
K 1
Now, Vol(B) can be computed in a similar way and we can easily establish that:
Vol(B) =
1
(K   1)!
K 3
2X
m=0
( 1)m

K   1
m
 K   2  2m
2K
K 1
:
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Finally, the following simple calculus gives the result:
Vol(P) =
1
(K   1)!
  K 12X
m=0
( 1)m

K   1
m
 K   2m
2K
K 1   K 32X
m=0
( 1)m

K   1
m
 K   2  2m
2K
K 1
=
1
(K   1)!
  1
2
K 1
+
K 1
2X
m=1
( 1)m[

K   1
m

+

K   1
m  1

]
 K   2m
2K
K 1
=
1
(K   1)!
  1
2
K 1
+
K 1
2X
m=1
( 1)m

K
m
 K   2m
2K
K 1
=
1
(K   1)!
K 1
2X
m=0
( 1)m

K
m
 K   2m
2K
K 1
: 
Using the analytical expression obtained in Proposition 3, we can extend the calculation
of cK = KK'(K) to larger values of K. The following Table gives the exact value of cK for
K = 5 to 49 (K odd).
K 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27
cK 2.995 3.577 4.076 4.521 4.925 5.298 5.647 5.976 6.288 6.584 6.870 7.143
K 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51
cK 7.408 7.657 7.903 8.141 8.372 8.597 8.817 9.031 9.240 9.444 9.644 9.840
Table 4 : Exact values of cK
Notice that the limiting result obtained in this subsection can be easily extended to the
case where N is even and the population is divided into K groups of size N
K
. The integer
K can be odd or even and the unique assumption is that N is an even multiple of K.
Let  (K) = lim
N!+1
[ 1
NK 1(
N 2
2
; N
K
  1; N
K
; :::; N
K
)]. With slight modications in the proof of
Proposition 3, we obtain:
 (K) =
1
(K   1)!
K 1
2X
m=0
( 1)m

K
m
 K   2m
2K
K 1
if K is odd, and
 (K) =
1
(K   1)!
K
2X
m=0
( 1)m

K
m
 K   2m
2K
K 1
if K is even.
As the relation in Proposition 4 is not easy to implement when K becomes large, we have
developed a probabilistic argument to conjecture that:
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Piv(;N) ' 1
N
r
6K

when K is large.
Our conjecture on the asymptotic behavior of cK when K tends to 1 is based upon
the following heuristic probabilistic argument. Proceeding as in remark 2 of section 3, the
probability of being pivotal for a small group of size N where  > 0 is xed can be expressed
as the probability of the event :
N
2
  N
2
 SN  N
2
+
N
2
where:
SN =
KX
k=1
SkN where S
k
N =
NkX
i=1
Xki and Nk =
N
K
The random variables S1N ; S
2
N ; :::; S
K
N are independent and identically distributed. Following
the argument used in Proposition 4 of Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981), we deduce that for
all k = 1; :::; K, S
k
N
Nk
converges weakly to the uniform law on the interval [0; 1] when Nk !1.
Since the SkN are independent, this implies that
SN
N
converges weakly to Z = 1
K
PK
k=1 U
k
where the random variables Uk are independent and identically distributed, with common
distribution the uniform distribution on [0; 1]. From the central limit theorem, we deduce
that if K is large then: PK
k=1 Uk
K
  1
2
' N(0; 1p
12K
)
since
q
1
12
is the standard deviation of the uniform variable on [0; 1]. We deduce then that
the probability of a group of relative size  to be pivotal denoted Piv(;N) is approximatively
equal to
Pr
(
  
2

PK
k=1 Uk
K
  1
2
 
2
)
' Pr

  
2
 N(0; 1p
12K)
 
2

' 
r
6K

Some values of
q
6K

are tabulated below:
K 3 5 7 9 11 ::: 49 ::: 99q
6K

2: 393 7 3: 090 2 3: 656 4 4: 145 9 4: 583 5 ::: 9: 673 8 ::: 13: 750 5
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Table 5 : Approximate values of cK
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have studied the impact of correlation across preferences and votes on
the probability of being pivotal under the majority rule and we have shown how increasing
correlation reduces this probability. To illustrate our contribution, consider 1000 voters
divided into K independent groups of equal size. In each group, preferences are generated
according to the IAC assumption. WhenK = 1000 we obtain the IC model with a probability
of being pivotal equal to
q
1
500
= :0252; the case with K = 1 corresponds to the usual IAC
model, with a probability of being pivotal equal to 1
1000
. The tools o¤ered in this paper
allow to consider all the possible intermediate situations between these two polar cases.
The following Table displays the probability of being pivotal for various values of K: these
probabilities are computed with the help of Proposition 1 for large values of K (K > 100)
and are deduced from Proposition 4 for small values of K.
K 1 2 4 5 ... 50 ... 100 ... 200 250 500 1000
Piv() .0010 .0020 .0027 .0030 ... .0096 ... .0138 ... .0195 .0178 .0219 .0252
Table 6 : Probability of being pivotal, 1000 voters, K groups
When the group sizes are not equal, our results suggest that, for large electorates, the
probability of casting a decisive vote does not depend on the size of the group to which the
voter belongs and is only governed by the distribution of the group sizes.
Let us conclude with two remarks.
In this paper, we have mostly focused on a specic pattern of correlation that we call
the IAC partitioning model. It is important to recall that this model is specic on two
grounds. First, it is based on a partition of the individuals such that individuals belonging
to two di¤erent groups in that partition have independent preferences. Second, it has been
assumed that in each group the correlations among the preferences in the group were resulting
from the IAC model. In this remark, we keep the partitioning assumption but examine a
particular generalization of the existing IAC version.
In the IAC setting, the correlation coe¢ cient between the votes of two voters from the
same group is equal to 1
3
. Let us consider instead the case where the correlation coe¢ cient
between the votes of two voters is positive but arbitrary18 and denoted by : Cov(Xik; Xjk),
18In Appendix 2, we prove that this construction is always possible. An alternative construction in the
spirit of the denition of IAC due to Berg (1990) is also possible through the family of Beta densities.
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the covariance between the votes of i and j when they belong to the same group is then
equal to 
4
. As before, as long as  6= 1 we obtain:
Lim
R!1
p
NPiv(s)(R; N) =
1q
1 +1
4
+ 
4
PS
l=2 
ll
p
2
In particular, in the case where N is a multiple of s and all groups are of size s, we obtain:
Lim
R!1
p
NPiv(s)(R; N) =
r
2

1p
1 +  (s  1)
We observe that
p
NPiv(s)(R; N) decreases with s and with . This is consistent with
intuition as an increase in s or an increase in  leads to more correlation among the votes
and less room for pivotality.
Our second remark is about another key assumption, namely the neutrality among the
two alternatives. We have assumed that the two alternatives were similar ex ante. One
interesting generalization could consist in assuming that there is a partition of the population
into groups where in each group the preferences are as here correlated but also possibly
biased towards one candidate. The bias could of course vary from group to another. In such
a setting a group could be dened as a subset of individuals displaying some homogeneity
dened through a vector of characteristics.
We are not aware of an ambitious attempt to generalize the current theory to a setting
that would allow for di¤erences across alternatives. To the best of our knowledge, the only19
model along these lines is due to Beck (1975). He considers a population divided into two
groups of equal size. In the rst group, the votes are independent and people vote left with
probability p  1
2
. In the second group, votes are also independent and people vote left with
probability 1   p. Beck estimates numerically the probability for a voter to be pivotal for
several values of the parameter p. Modulo a simple adjustment of the proof of Proposition
1, we obtain an asymptotic exact value of the probability of being pivotal in Becks model.
Precisely, we obtain :
Lim
N!1
p
NPiv(;N) =
1p
2p(1  p)
When p = 1
2
, we obtain the traditional constant
q
2

= 0:797 88. When p = 3
4
, we
obtain 1p
2 3
16
= 0:921 32 and when p = 4
5
; we obtain 1p
2 4
25
= 0:997 36. Moving towards
polarization increases drastically the probability of being pivotal!
19See also Berg (1990) for another illustration.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Berks Theorem
For each k = 1; 2,...let n = n(k) and m = m(k) be specied and suppose that yk1 ; y
k
2 ; :::; y
k
n
is an m dependent triangular array of random variables with zero means20. Assume the
following conditions hold. For some  > 0 and some constants M and K:
(i) E
yki 2+ M for all i and all k.
(ii) V ar
 
yki+1 + :::+ y
k
j
  (j   i)K for all i; j, and k.
(iii) Lim
k!1
V ar(yk1+:::+ykn)
n
exists and is nonzero. Denote v the limit.
(iv) Lim
k!1
m2+
2

n
= 0
Then y
k
1+:::+y
k
np
n
is asymptotically normal with mean 0 and variance v.
6.2 Positively Correlated Bernoulli Random Variables
In this appendix, we present a procedure to generate correlation patterns for vectors of
Bernoulli random variables with parameter 1
2
. Consider a Gaussian vector z  (z1; z2; :::; zn)
such that the random variables zi are identically distributed with rst moment equal to
0 and let 
 = (ij)1i;jn = 
2
 
ij

1i;jn to denote its variance-covariance matrix with
2 = E(z2i ) and ii = 1 for all i = 1; :::; n. We derive from z a vector x  (x1; x2; :::; xn) of
Bernoulli random variables such that Pr (xi = 1) = 12 for all i = 1; 2; :::; n as follows. Let:
xi =

1 if zi  0
0 if zi < 0
From Stieljess formula (Gupta (1963)), we obtain that21
Cov(xi; xj) = Pr (zi  0 and zj  0)  1
4
=
arcsin ij
2
:
In particular when 
 = I+
0BB@
1 1 : 1
1 1 : 1
: : : :
1 1 : 1
1CCA where  > 0, we obtain 2 = 1+ and ij = 
for all i 6= j. Note that 
 is positive denite and is therefore the variance-covariance matrix
of a gaussian vector. We derive ij =

1+
for all i 6= j. In such setting, all the correlation
coe¢ cients are equal and span all the values from 0 to 1 when  spans the range [0;+1[.
20The triangular array

ykn(k)

k1
is m dependent if  yk1 ; yk2 ; :::; ykj  and ykj+n; ykj+1+n; :::; ykj+n+l are
independent whenever n > m (Billingsley(1995)).
21Note that since arcsinx = x+ x
3
6 +
3x5
40 +O(x
5), this implies that Cov(xi; xj) ' ij2 in the neighborhood
of 0.
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6.3 Intragroup Perfect Correlation
In the case of perfect correlation i.e.  = 1; we need to be more careful as we cannot use
Petrovs theorem. The reason is easy to see in the case where all the groups are of same
size s. In such case the variables ZRk and W
R
i introduced in the proof of Proposition 1 have
respectively a span of s and a span of s  1. Only the ZRk variables appear innitely often.
To see what is going on, consider the case where s = 2 i.e. the case where the N random
variables are grouped into M  N
2
packs of size 2. Let us focus on the case where M is odd.
In such case:
Piv(R; 2) = Prob( SRi  WRi =
N   2
2
)
Since all the variables in the sum are independent, identically distributed with a maximal
span of 2 and a variance equal to 1, we deduce from the standard Moivre-Laplaces local
theorem22that:
Lim
R!1
1
2
r
N   2
2
Prob( SRi  WRi =
N   2
2
) =
1p
2
and therefore:
Lim
R!1
p
NPiv(R; 2) =
2p

' 1: 128 4
which is di¤erent from corresponds to the value of
q
2

1p
1+(s 1) =
1p

' 0:5642 when
 = 1 and s = 2. More generally, consider the case of an arbitrary value of s i.e. the
case where the N random variables are grouped into M  N
s
of size s which correspond to
M = N
s
independent and identically distributed Bernouilli random variables. Let us focus
on the case where M is odd. As above, we deduce that:
Piv(R; s) = Prob( SRi  WRi =
N   s
2
) '
r
2

1p
M
=
r
2s

1p
N
and therefore:
Lim
R!1
p
NPiv(R; s) =
r
2s

22Alternatively, it is also a direct consequence of Gnedenko s theorem (1948) (theorem 1 in chapter 7 of
Petrov (1975)) as all the variables in the sum are independent, identically distributed with a maximal span
of 2 and variance equal to 1.
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For the case where s = 3, we obtain
q
6

= 1: 382 which is larger than
q
2

1p
1+(s 1) =q
2

1p
3
= 0:46066. This discontinuity (we jump from
q
2
s
to
q
2s

) in the neighborhood of
 = 1 is rather peculiar but corresponds to the fact that when  = 1, the voters belonging to
the same group vote as a block. Everything is as if we had a population of N
s
independent
voters.
6.4 The Le Breton and Lepelley s Historical case Study
An interesting setting where the correlations are not the same across all voters appears
in the Le Breton and Lepelley (2011) study of the French electoral law of June 29 1820.
This electoral law, known as the "law of double vote", has been used in France to elect the
deputies from 1820 to 1830. France was divided into a number of electoral districts (the so
called French départements") and each district sent a number of deputies to the chamber.
Each district was divided itself into subdistricts (the so called arrondissements"). Each
arrondissement elected one deputy and to be voter in an arrondissement, your amount of
tax had to be above some xed level (called the cens"). In addition, the voters in the top
quartile of the income distribution of the voters in the département were members of an
additional electoral college which elected D additional deputies. These rich" voters had a
double vote: they voted in their arrondissement and also in the electoral college constituted
at the level of the département. This explains the name which was given to this law. It was
decided that 3
5
of the deputies was elected by the arrondissements and 2
5
by the voters in
the top colleges. Le Breton and Lepelley (2011) study a symmetric version of that problem
where there are K départements, with A arrondissements in each département and 4r + 1
voters in each arrondissement where r is an odd integer denoting the number of voters with
two votes in that arrondissement. The size N of the chamber is therefore K(A + D)23. A
good approximation of the French data at that time is given by K = 86, A = 3 and D = 2
leading to N = 430: 258 being elected in arrondissements and 172 elected by the top colleges.
Hereafter, we will limit however our attention to the case where K is odd. In the case where
A = 3 and D = 2, the 5K deputies are partitioned into groups of size 5. These legislators
have in common to be elected from the same territory. Even if we assume that the preferences
of the A(4r+1) voters across the A districts are independent, the preferences of the deputies
are not independent because some voters have a double vote. Let
 
S1j ; S
2
j ; S
3
j ; S
4
j ; S
5
j

be the
prole of the ve votes in the jth département where the rst three coordinates denote the
votes in the three arrondissements and the last two the votes in the top college. When r is
23They assumed that A is an odd integer and that D is an even integer.
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large this random vector is approximatively Gaussian with (after normalization) the matrix
of variances-covariances:

 =
0BBBBB@
p
4r+1
2
0 0
p
r
2
p
r
2
0
p
4r+1
2
0
p
r
2
p
r
2
0 0
p
4r+1
2
p
r
2
p
r
2p
r
2
p
r
2
p
r
2
p
3r
2
p
3r
2p
r
2
p
r
2
p
r
2
p
3r
2
p
3r
2
1CCCCCA
We note that the coe¢ cient of correlation  between any of the rst three variables and
any of the last two ones is equal to
q
1
12
Consider now the 5-dimensional vector of Bernoulli
variables
 
X1j ; X
2
j ; X
3
j ; X
4
j ; X
5
j

where X lj = 1 if S
l
j  2r + 1 for l = 1; 2; 3 and X lj = 1 if
Slj  Ar+12 for l = 4; 5. Based on the Gaussian orthant probabilities, the matrix of variances-
covariances of this vector is:0BBBB@
1
4
0 0 1
4
+ arcsin 
2
1
4
+ arcsin 
2
0 1
4
0 1
4
+ arcsin 
2
1
4
+ arcsin 
2
0 0 1
4
1
4
+ arcsin 
2
1
4
+ arcsin 
2
1
4
+ arcsin 
2
1
4
+ arcsin 
2
1
4
+ arcsin 
2
1
4
1
4
1
4
+ arcsin 
2
1
4
+ arcsin 
2
1
4
+ arcsin 
2
1
4
1
4
1CCCCA
In the specic case where  =
q
1
12
, we obtain that 1
4
+ arcsin 
2
= 0:29849. Since the
random variables X1j + X
2
j + X
3
j + X
4
j + X
5
j are independent, identically distributed and
have a span equal to 1, by using the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1, we
deduce that the probability for a deputy to be pivotal if both r and K are large integers is
approximatively equal to:
1
1
4
+ 1p
5

1
2
+ 6 0:29849p2N ' 0:313 01pN
6.5 Petrov Local Limit Central Theorem
Let k be an arbitrary xed positive integer. A sequence of random variables (yn)n1 is
said to be a k sequence if the number of di¤erent distribution functions in the sequence of
the distribution functions corresponding to (yn)n1 is equal to k. Consider a k sequence
of independent integer-valued random variables (yn)n1 each having nite variance. We
denote by F 1; :::; F l the l distributions which are non-degenerate and occur innitely often
in the sequence (F i)1ik. We denote by H
r the maximal span of F r for r = 1; :::; l. Let
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Sn =
Pn
j=1 yj;Mn =
Pn
j=1E(yj), Bn =
Pn
j=1E(yj   E(yj))2 and Prn (N) = Pr(Sn = N).
Then:
If g.c.d.
 
H1; H2; :::; H l

= 1, then Sup
N
pBn Prn (N)  1p2e  (N Mn)22Bn
 !n!1 0
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